One key. 26 secrets. 86 vehicle-control scopes. Lock, unlock, remote start, digital key, GPS tracking — all reachable from a single hardcoded encryption key that ships inside every copy of the My Bentley app. 100+ days after disclosure, the key has not been rotated.
Remediation after 100+ days: Zero confirmed fixes. AES-256-GCM key remains identical between v5.19.0 (July) and v5.20.0 (August). Vendor acknowledged initial contact, then went silent. NCSC (UK) notified.
The class uk.co.bentley.mybentley.backend.Secrets implements a custom Secret property delegate that decrypts all embedded secrets at runtime using AES-256-GCM. The encryption key is hardcoded as a byte array inside the getValue() method:
public String a(Secrets thisRef, KProperty property) {
return c(
new byte[]{
97, 57, 101, 49, 51, 56, 98, 101, // a 9 e 1 3 8 b e
56, 48, 51, 97, 52, 54, 56, 97, // 8 0 3 a 4 6 8 a
56, 97, 51, 55, 52, 97, 53, 56, // 8 a 3 7 4 a 5 8
101, 52, 54, 102, 49, 97, 56, 51 // e 4 6 f 1 a 8 3
},
this.encryptedValue
);
}
Plaintext key (ASCII):
a9e138be803a468a8a374a58e46f1a83
The decryption routine splits each Base64-decoded blob into a 12-byte GCM nonce (IV) and the ciphertext, then decrypts with AES/GCM/NoPadding and a 96-bit authentication tag:
byte[] decoded = Base64.getDecoder().decode(encryptedValue);
byte[] iv = Arrays.copyOfRange(decoded, 0, 12); // 12-byte GCM nonce
byte[] ct = Arrays.copyOfRange(decoded, 12, decoded.length);
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(encryptionKey, "AES");
GCMParameterSpec spec = new GCMParameterSpec(96, iv);
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding");
cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key, spec);
return new String(cipher.doFinal(ct), UTF_8);
This key was identical in v5.19.0 (analysed July 14) and v5.20.0 (re-analysed August 26) — 43 days without rotation. As of this disclosure (November 3), no new version has been released.
All values below are shipped inside the APK and are decryptable by anyone with the key above. Encrypted (Base64) blobs as found in Secrets.java:
| # | Secret Name | Encrypted Value (Base64, truncated) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | googlePlacesApiKey | rY01PdvIOsB73oJjqUB98lu2x1Xh6zjL1+QEC8ZFalmaXFCK... |
| 2 | firebaseQMProjectId | sHW3IrG4i9IpopdInKHpul8JadwNPjtEKwrcLqGgY8CUFDQ... |
| 3 | firebaseQMApiKey | yawXv5mAxquy97pwPDMFn34kZ/uWYc42uSJVI4YFXubbDu0... |
| 4 | idkClientID Android RoW Live | 3lmPI1pKrQsyLZuqa4v+l2my7wYzf46EKPT0YzuUAJ7RqDr... |
| 5 | idkClientID Android RoW Approval | YEl2/Wy6fc5Iua3hesQCuvFEJToOumgKms2Sj2CpDsVsClE... |
| 6 | idkClientID Android RoW Dev | 07V9gt3jrOSK/AA9+EFZdAqYBzrFJ3FqxLsg0Qq6rgMs9y5... |
| 7 | idkClientID Android China Live | C4U/+ji/BA6HjSAmDfqDVM2dqh+hEko5u03lKvNVMlsA3LN... |
| 8 | idkClientID Android China Approval | OpNJ6M5e+5M/KR6EFMJhLRkbbXn9KDzuJawicqWULV1shRF... |
| 9 | idkClientID Android China Dev | Faci39tTG9Qbf1Q/YYXqsFes+c0JJ5XBASCrDKmixAeeQvR... |
| 10 | idkClientID Android S. Korea Sandbox | EnZLX5BdB3X8FZNjLTZG+fVaQDW7uuL0msTTkqyJFlpUc7Z... |
| 11 | idkClientID Android S. Korea Live | ayE/6WX1nsd8mWLJuIPkAy8/dnpe1ISVlOZqQAY2ubXJbfb... |
| 12 | hereBentleyAppID Dev | AtogLiUYt6bpKaMXpMe69wnCXUA9StLa3HU1MfJU2zJqbNV... |
| 13 | hereBentleyAppID Live | Bd5jGzd7kW3oTNFWx2gONfNXnZXps1j+TJAWuIffUR5ahnr... |
| 14 | hereBentleyAppCode Dev | 0J33PztWXmAqpNwQBExe+vBIcFxxJ/E8LrmmOXTGdsDvJB2... |
| 15 | hereBentleyAppCode Live | s/Hzc5mVwKqNVr+maHzjLs408Flk1WavGQOOgfcQbNe8Zxb... |
| 16 | audialsSecret | 1KdFZGo5V10pEc0yGFfPzWAdRLqr2ZK4QyuFImKo8/yQnq8... |
| 17 | phraseDistributionId | 3PHDZPUMe7qQegeq99a35MOCCsMgAxZmIBEUkjra/xrJAAY... |
| 18 | phraseEnvironmentToken Dev | v3Pa7Wn0YCBnv3pIqr4VKsnb5MIjTRP9KZotswENKFi0yLI... |
| 19 | phraseEnvironmentToken Prod | oYSECg3cjEcY7Ryv9K00LrZ7EF6mgv0ljVXbezXcax042Cr... |
| 20 | flagsmithEnvKey RoW Live | ef5BH8t9i5uDC/ZyoZ6Z4dIcqtR/R/6E+P7fjfJcqtNybqW... |
| 21 | flagsmithEnvKey RoW Sandbox | y2RlE7wW2GzNmjhyX78QxrMqmgNVg247c5ANXne2DfSb8Dn... |
| 22 | flagsmithEnvKey China Live | ZNjmy2CNgJIyPAsMwYu/xaWATveSe+w2qGnEDcdZ/Ihohrc... |
| 23 | flagsmithEnvKey China Sandbox | EvY8L5a1VTSn5WAkj5YbhX/xz0eAhALa58pHU62oKuyuCpj... |
| 24 | firebaseQM ApplicationId | mV6bo0bCOD0NfPnQabTQSRFat3wAheG3UhjMr8tPt2+IrNl... |
| 25 | appSignature | HD0v0v60QAnGdZT+3vcYZo0Ri//jaE6AKCS/wGgt7vR/qai... |
The IDK (Identity Development Kit) client IDs extracted from the My Bentley APK are recognised by identity.vwgroup.io, the shared VW Group OIDC provider operated by CARIAD. The token endpoint accepts three high-risk grant types:
86 production scopes include:
lock_unlock remote_start digitalKey
honk gpsPosition vehicleSpeed
charging climatisation parking_position
vehicle_data trip_statistics vehicle_health
fuel_status battery_status departure_timers
access_control geofencing speed_alert
...
These scopes are shared across VW Group brands: VW, Audi, Porsche, Bentley, Lamborghini, SEAT/CUPRA, Skoda.
The sandbox environment exposes 92 scopes (6 additional test scopes leaked: weRoute-test-scope, id3Neo_test, weInsure_test, allSemanticIDs_test, and two others).
The BentleyID Portal at bentleyid.vwgroup.io ships a 3.6 MB JavaScript bundle (app.js) that contains 12 IDK client-to-service mappings not present in the mobile APK:
vwid.vwgroup.io (VW ID)Combined with the APK: 20+ unique IDK clients identified with zero overlap between the two sources.
| Portal | Status | Stack |
|---|---|---|
| connected.support.bentleymotors.com | 200 OK | Angular (Production) |
| dev-connected.support.bentleymotors.com | 200 OK | Angular (DEV — public!) |
| cwat.support.bentleymotors.com | 200 OK | SvelteKit (MOD Mobile Webview) |
| vts.support.bentleymotors.com | 401/403 | Auth required |
| shop.bentleymotors.com | 200 OK | 156 KB bundle |
The DEV environment contains an isChineseDeployment misconfiguration flag and exposes internal routing/configuration.
The CARIAD rhmi.discovery.legacy module (CryptMessage.java) implements:
SecureRandom, modular exponentiation to derive a 256-bit shared secret truncated to 32 bytesSecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(sharedSecret, 0, 32, "AES");
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/PKCS7Padding");
cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key);
return new String(cipher.doFinal(Base64.decode(input)));
This layer handles RHMI (Remote HMI) discovery between the phone and the vehicle head unit.
The app's network_security_config.xml base-config allows cleartext traffic, enabling passive interception on untrusted networks.
Through the IDK clients and the VW Group identity infrastructure, the following backend systems are in scope:
infosecurity@bentley.co.uk or directly to Graeme. No response.Bentley Motors / CARIAD: Graeme Smith (IT SOC Manager) responded on 22 July 2026, proposing Intigriti as the disclosure channel. We declined (company policy — BuriLabs does not operate on Intigriti) and offered three alternatives: direct encrypted email, phone call, or Bugcrowd/HackerOne. On 26 August, Graeme confirmed the team was working on it internally with CARIAD, but insisted Intigriti was "the only way" to pay a bounty. We replied the same day: no bounty needed — just tell us where to send the full report. That question was never answered.
A formal escalation was sent on 27 September (75 days elapsed, NCSC CC'd). No response.
The full technical report was never requested, never delivered, and never reviewed — because the vendor never provided an ingestion channel despite being asked directly.
Total silence since 26 August: 69 days. Total elapsed: 104 days.
| App | My Bentley |
|---|---|
| Package | uk.co.bentley.mybentley |
| Versions Tested | v5.19.0, v5.20.0 |
| Platform | Android (Google Play) |
| Shared Infrastructure | identity.vwgroup.io (CARIAD / VW Group) |
Discovered and reported by Burak Yilmaz, BuriLabs Security Research.
Reference: BuriLabs-BENTLEY-001