BURILABS
SECURITY ADVISORY · SA-2026-BM-001 · 3 November 2026

Bentley Motors: Hardcoded AES-256 Master Key Decrypts 26 Production Secrets — 86 Vehicle Control Scopes Exposed via VW Group Identity Platform

One key. 26 secrets. 86 vehicle-control scopes. Lock, unlock, remote start, digital key, GPS tracking — all reachable from a single hardcoded encryption key that ships inside every copy of the My Bentley app. 100+ days after disclosure, the key has not been rotated.

8 Findings 2 Critical 1 High 3 Medium

Remediation after 100+ days: Zero confirmed fixes. AES-256-GCM key remains identical between v5.19.0 (July) and v5.20.0 (August). Vendor acknowledged initial contact, then went silent. NCSC (UK) notified.

Finding 1 — Critical: Hardcoded AES-256-GCM Master Key

The class uk.co.bentley.mybentley.backend.Secrets implements a custom Secret property delegate that decrypts all embedded secrets at runtime using AES-256-GCM. The encryption key is hardcoded as a byte array inside the getValue() method:

Secrets$Secret.java — Decryption method (decompiled from classes5.dex)
public String a(Secrets thisRef, KProperty property) {
    return c(
        new byte[]{
            97, 57, 101, 49, 51, 56, 98, 101,   // a 9 e 1 3 8 b e
            56, 48, 51, 97, 52, 54, 56, 97,      // 8 0 3 a 4 6 8 a
            56, 97, 51, 55, 52, 97, 53, 56,      // 8 a 3 7 4 a 5 8
            101, 52, 54, 102, 49, 97, 56, 51     // e 4 6 f 1 a 8 3
        },
        this.encryptedValue
    );
}

Plaintext key (ASCII):

a9e138be803a468a8a374a58e46f1a83

The decryption routine splits each Base64-decoded blob into a 12-byte GCM nonce (IV) and the ciphertext, then decrypts with AES/GCM/NoPadding and a 96-bit authentication tag:

Decryption routine
byte[] decoded = Base64.getDecoder().decode(encryptedValue);
byte[] iv   = Arrays.copyOfRange(decoded, 0, 12);   // 12-byte GCM nonce
byte[] ct   = Arrays.copyOfRange(decoded, 12, decoded.length);

SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(encryptionKey, "AES");
GCMParameterSpec spec = new GCMParameterSpec(96, iv);
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding");
cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key, spec);
return new String(cipher.doFinal(ct), UTF_8);

This key was identical in v5.19.0 (analysed July 14) and v5.20.0 (re-analysed August 26) — 43 days without rotation. As of this disclosure (November 3), no new version has been released.

The 26 Encrypted Production Secrets

All values below are shipped inside the APK and are decryptable by anyone with the key above. Encrypted (Base64) blobs as found in Secrets.java:

#Secret NameEncrypted Value (Base64, truncated)
1googlePlacesApiKeyrY01PdvIOsB73oJjqUB98lu2x1Xh6zjL1+QEC8ZFalmaXFCK...
2firebaseQMProjectIdsHW3IrG4i9IpopdInKHpul8JadwNPjtEKwrcLqGgY8CUFDQ...
3firebaseQMApiKeyyawXv5mAxquy97pwPDMFn34kZ/uWYc42uSJVI4YFXubbDu0...
4idkClientID Android RoW Live3lmPI1pKrQsyLZuqa4v+l2my7wYzf46EKPT0YzuUAJ7RqDr...
5idkClientID Android RoW ApprovalYEl2/Wy6fc5Iua3hesQCuvFEJToOumgKms2Sj2CpDsVsClE...
6idkClientID Android RoW Dev07V9gt3jrOSK/AA9+EFZdAqYBzrFJ3FqxLsg0Qq6rgMs9y5...
7idkClientID Android China LiveC4U/+ji/BA6HjSAmDfqDVM2dqh+hEko5u03lKvNVMlsA3LN...
8idkClientID Android China ApprovalOpNJ6M5e+5M/KR6EFMJhLRkbbXn9KDzuJawicqWULV1shRF...
9idkClientID Android China DevFaci39tTG9Qbf1Q/YYXqsFes+c0JJ5XBASCrDKmixAeeQvR...
10idkClientID Android S. Korea SandboxEnZLX5BdB3X8FZNjLTZG+fVaQDW7uuL0msTTkqyJFlpUc7Z...
11idkClientID Android S. Korea LiveayE/6WX1nsd8mWLJuIPkAy8/dnpe1ISVlOZqQAY2ubXJbfb...
12hereBentleyAppID DevAtogLiUYt6bpKaMXpMe69wnCXUA9StLa3HU1MfJU2zJqbNV...
13hereBentleyAppID LiveBd5jGzd7kW3oTNFWx2gONfNXnZXps1j+TJAWuIffUR5ahnr...
14hereBentleyAppCode Dev0J33PztWXmAqpNwQBExe+vBIcFxxJ/E8LrmmOXTGdsDvJB2...
15hereBentleyAppCode Lives/Hzc5mVwKqNVr+maHzjLs408Flk1WavGQOOgfcQbNe8Zxb...
16audialsSecret1KdFZGo5V10pEc0yGFfPzWAdRLqr2ZK4QyuFImKo8/yQnq8...
17phraseDistributionId3PHDZPUMe7qQegeq99a35MOCCsMgAxZmIBEUkjra/xrJAAY...
18phraseEnvironmentToken Devv3Pa7Wn0YCBnv3pIqr4VKsnb5MIjTRP9KZotswENKFi0yLI...
19phraseEnvironmentToken ProdoYSECg3cjEcY7Ryv9K00LrZ7EF6mgv0ljVXbezXcax042Cr...
20flagsmithEnvKey RoW Liveef5BH8t9i5uDC/ZyoZ6Z4dIcqtR/R/6E+P7fjfJcqtNybqW...
21flagsmithEnvKey RoW Sandboxy2RlE7wW2GzNmjhyX78QxrMqmgNVg247c5ANXne2DfSb8Dn...
22flagsmithEnvKey China LiveZNjmy2CNgJIyPAsMwYu/xaWATveSe+w2qGnEDcdZ/Ihohrc...
23flagsmithEnvKey China SandboxEvY8L5a1VTSn5WAkj5YbhX/xz0eAhALa58pHU62oKuyuCpj...
24firebaseQM ApplicationIdmV6bo0bCOD0NfPnQabTQSRFat3wAheG3UhjMr8tPt2+IrNl...
25appSignatureHD0v0v60QAnGdZT+3vcYZo0Ri//jaE6AKCS/wGgt7vR/qai...
Note: Decrypted plaintext values are intentionally omitted. The key + encrypted blobs are both shipped inside the publicly distributed APK — any reader can verify decryption independently. Publishing active credentials that control vehicles would create unnecessary risk to Bentley owners.

Finding 2 — High: VW Group Identity Platform — 86 Vehicle Control Scopes

The IDK (Identity Development Kit) client IDs extracted from the My Bentley APK are recognised by identity.vwgroup.io, the shared VW Group OIDC provider operated by CARIAD. The token endpoint accepts three high-risk grant types:

  • ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) — direct username/password exchange, deprecated by RFC 6749
  • device_code — device authorization flow
  • client_credentials — machine-to-machine without user consent

86 production scopes include:

lock_unlock          remote_start         digitalKey
honk                 gpsPosition          vehicleSpeed
charging             climatisation        parking_position
vehicle_data         trip_statistics      vehicle_health
fuel_status          battery_status       departure_timers
access_control       geofencing           speed_alert
...

These scopes are shared across VW Group brands: VW, Audi, Porsche, Bentley, Lamborghini, SEAT/CUPRA, Skoda.

The sandbox environment exposes 92 scopes (6 additional test scopes leaked: weRoute-test-scope, id3Neo_test, weInsure_test, allSemanticIDs_test, and two others).

Finding 3 — Medium: BentleyID Portal Leaks 12 Cross-Brand Client IDs

The BentleyID Portal at bentleyid.vwgroup.io ships a 3.6 MB JavaScript bundle (app.js) that contains 12 IDK client-to-service mappings not present in the mobile APK:

  • VW Connect, We Connect, Amarok, PayByPhone client registrations
  • Service mappings to backend microservices across brands
  • The portal shares its codebase with vwid.vwgroup.io (VW ID)

Combined with the APK: 20+ unique IDK clients identified with zero overlap between the two sources.

Finding 4 — Medium: DEV Support Portal Publicly Accessible

PortalStatusStack
connected.support.bentleymotors.com200 OKAngular (Production)
dev-connected.support.bentleymotors.com200 OKAngular (DEV — public!)
cwat.support.bentleymotors.com200 OKSvelteKit (MOD Mobile Webview)
vts.support.bentleymotors.com401/403Auth required
shop.bentleymotors.com200 OK156 KB bundle

The DEV environment contains an isChineseDeployment misconfiguration flag and exposes internal routing/configuration.

Finding 5 — Medium: CARIAD Legacy Discovery — AES/ECB with Weak Diffie-Hellman

The CARIAD rhmi.discovery.legacy module (CryptMessage.java) implements:

  • AES/ECB/PKCS7Padding — ECB mode processes each block independently, leaking patterns in the plaintext. No initialization vector.
  • Weak Diffie-Hellman — random exponent between 128–255 bits with SecureRandom, modular exponentiation to derive a 256-bit shared secret truncated to 32 bytes
CryptMessage.java — ECB decryption
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(sharedSecret, 0, 32, "AES");
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/PKCS7Padding");
cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key);
return new String(cipher.doFinal(Base64.decode(input)));

This layer handles RHMI (Remote HMI) discovery between the phone and the vehicle head unit.

Finding 6 — Low: Network Security Configuration Permits Cleartext

The app's network_security_config.xml base-config allows cleartext traffic, enabling passive interception on untrusted networks.

Scope: What Is Reachable From This Layer

Through the IDK clients and the VW Group identity infrastructure, the following backend systems are in scope:

  • GCCA — Group Connected Car Automation (vehicle connectivity backbone)
  • RxSWIN — software update management
  • Sirius PKI/SSH — certificate infrastructure
  • HALO — credential management (prod/QA/test)
  • FlashLab Cloud — remote ECU flashing
  • BatteryPass — EU compliance system
  • LLM-as-a-Service, AgenticOS, AutoMind — internal AI/ML platform
This advisory covers only the Bentley-specific findings. VW Group-wide identity infrastructure findings are subject to separate coordinated disclosure via VW CERT / Bugcrowd.

Disclosure Timeline

Vendor Response

Bentley Motors / CARIAD: Graeme Smith (IT SOC Manager) responded on 22 July 2026, proposing Intigriti as the disclosure channel. We declined (company policy — BuriLabs does not operate on Intigriti) and offered three alternatives: direct encrypted email, phone call, or Bugcrowd/HackerOne. On 26 August, Graeme confirmed the team was working on it internally with CARIAD, but insisted Intigriti was "the only way" to pay a bounty. We replied the same day: no bounty needed — just tell us where to send the full report. That question was never answered.

A formal escalation was sent on 27 September (75 days elapsed, NCSC CC'd). No response.

The full technical report was never requested, never delivered, and never reviewed — because the vendor never provided an ingestion channel despite being asked directly.

Total silence since 26 August: 69 days. Total elapsed: 104 days.

Affected Product

AppMy Bentley
Packageuk.co.bentley.mybentley
Versions Testedv5.19.0, v5.20.0
PlatformAndroid (Google Play)
Shared Infrastructureidentity.vwgroup.io (CARIAD / VW Group)

Recommendations

  1. Rotate the AES-256-GCM key immediately and implement per-secret or per-environment unique keys
  2. Move all secrets to server-side configuration — never ship decryption keys inside a client APK
  3. Disable ROPC grant type on the identity.vwgroup.io client registrations
  4. Restrict DEV portals behind VPN or IP allowlisting
  5. Replace AES/ECB in the CARIAD RHMI legacy layer with AES/GCM or AES/CBC with HMAC
  6. Enforce certificate pinning (ideally with a backup pin and reporting endpoint)
  7. Implement a functioning vulnerability disclosure programme — the Intigriti launch promised for July 2026 was never delivered

Credits

Discovered and reported by Burak Yilmaz, BuriLabs Security Research.
Reference: BuriLabs-BENTLEY-001