BURILABS
SECURITY ADVISORY · SA-2026-FER-001 · 5 November 2026

Ferrari MyFerrari App: Device Code Flow Grants Full Microsoft Graph Access — InsightBot AI Backend Exposed with Swagger UI, Salesforce GraphQL Leaks 706 Types Without Authentication

13 Azure AD client IDs. 3 tenants. 5 clients accept Device Code Flow with full Microsoft Graph scopes — Mail.Read, Files.Read.All, Directory.Read.All. The InsightBot AI production backend ships an open Swagger UI. Salesforce GraphQL returns 706 types, 53 profiles, and 24 approval workflows — no authentication required. Ferrari dismissed these findings as "not eligible for Hall of Fame."

17 Findings 4 Critical 3 High 6 Medium 3 Low · 1 Info

Remediation after 120+ days: Zero confirmed fixes. All Device Code Flow endpoints remain active. InsightBot Swagger UI still accessible. Marketing Cloud push credentials confirmed working. Vendor dismissed findings without technical review.

Finding 1 — Critical: Device Code Flow → Corporate Account Takeover via Microsoft Graph

Five Azure AD client IDs extracted from the publicly available APK and HTTP response headers can initiate Device Code Flow on Ferrari's corporate Azure AD tenant (51cc9718-...), requesting unrestricted Microsoft Graph API scopes:

Client IDSourceCorporate DCGraph Scope
607073c1-...APK MSAL PRODYESYES
aeabe035-...APK MSAL STAGINGYESYES
0ca73ac6-...App Proxy HTTP headersYESYES
afc36caa-...Salesforce SSO redirectYESYES
ac653b01-...EasyAuth redirectYESYES

All dangerous Graph scopes accepted:

Mail.Read          — Read all employee emails
Mail.ReadWrite     — Read AND send emails as employee
Files.Read.All     — OneDrive + SharePoint files
User.Read.All      — Enumerate entire corporate directory
Directory.Read.All — Full directory structure
Sites.Read.All     — All SharePoint sites
Team.ReadBasic.All — All Microsoft Teams
Calendars.Read     — Employee calendar events
offline_access     — Persistent refresh token
Device Code Flow PoC (App Proxy client)
POST /51cc9718-.../oauth2/v2.0/devicecode
Host: login.microsoftonline.com

client_id=0ca73ac6-...&scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default

→ 200 OK
{
  "user_code": "D3E4DXBLH",
  "verification_uri": "https://login.microsoft.com/device",
  "expires_in": 900,
  "message": "To sign in, use a web browser to open the page
              https://login.microsoft.com/device and enter
              the code D3E4DXBLH to authenticate."
}

The attack uses Microsoft's own legitimate login page — no phishing domain, no spoofed page. An employee entering the device code at login.microsoft.com/device grants the attacker full Graph API access with persistent refresh tokens.

Impact: B2C mobile app client IDs registered on the corporate tenant with no scope restrictions = full corporate account takeover vector. Emails, files, directory, Teams, calendar — all accessible via a single social engineering step on Microsoft's genuine infrastructure.

Finding 2 — Critical: InsightBot AI Backend — Full Swagger UI + user_impersonation

Ferrari's internal AI assistant InsightBot — powered by Azure OpenAI + Azure AI Search (RAG) — has its production backend exposed with full Swagger UI:

ComponentHostnameStatus
PROD Backendapp-ib-myferrari-be-prod.azurewebsites.net200 — Swagger UI + OpenAPI open
PROD Frontendapp-ib-myferrari-fe-prod.azurewebsites.net403 — Disabled
Custom Domaininsightbot.ferrari.com401 — Corp Azure AD

8 API endpoints exposed via OpenAPI 3.1.0 spec:

EndpointMethodFunction
/chatPOSTQuery internal knowledge base (Azure OpenAI RAG)
/chat/streamPOSTStreaming chat with SSE
/getChatHistoryGETRetrieve chat histories (IDOR via conversation_id)
/content/{path}GETDownload files from Azure Blob Storage
/store_answerPOSTInject/modify answers in knowledge base
/deleteChatHistoryPOSTDelete conversation histories
/sendFeedbackPOSTSubmit feedback on responses
/realtimeWebSocketReal-time voice chat (GPT-4o)

Security filter bypass: The chat API accepts client-controlled parameters use_groups_security_filter and use_oid_security_filter — toggling them to false bypasses all access controls on the RAG knowledge base.

CORS misconfiguration: access-control-allow-origin: * — any website can make cross-origin requests to the InsightBot API.

Combined with Device Code Flow (Finding 1): 5 public client IDs accept user_impersonation scope on the InsightBot Backend API (api://3844adce-...). A single social engineering step gives an attacker full access to Ferrari's internal AI, knowledge base, chat histories, and blob storage.

Finding 3 — Critical: Salesforce GraphQL — 706 Types Without Authentication

The Ferrari MyStore at mystore.ferrari.com (Salesforce Experience Cloud) exposes its full GraphQL API without authentication:

MetricCount
GraphQL Types706
Internal Profiles53 (Ferrari Dealer, Hostess, Executive Sponsor, Concierge, Einstein Agent, SCIM Admin...)
Approval Workflows24 (Atelier, Tailor Made, Factory Tours, Corse Clienti, WEC Sponsor...)
Static Resources375 (103.8 MB)
Entity Definitions178
User Type Fields225
Queryable sObjects32+

Internal profiles exposed reveal Ferrari's complete organizational hierarchy: dealer networks, event staff (Hostess, Executive Sponsor), racing programs (Corse Clienti, WEC), AI agents (Einstein Agent), and administrative roles (SCIM Admin, Platform Integration User).

Approval workflows expose Ferrari's internal business processes: Atelier customization, Tailor Made program, Factory Tours authorization, racing sponsorship approval — revealing operational details and customer management structure.

Impact: Complete Salesforce org schema enumeration without any authentication. 53 internal profiles = organizational structure mapped. 24 approval workflows = business processes revealed. 225 User-type fields = potential PII exposure if SOQL queries succeed.

Finding 4 — Critical: Salesforce SSO Chain — 36 OAuth Scopes + Device Code

The Salesforce SSO authentication flow from mystore.ferrari.com reveals a complete authentication chain exposing the 12th Azure AD client ID and 36 OAuth scopes:

SSO redirect chain extraction
GET /services/auth/sso/Azure_AD_B2C
Host: mystore.ferrari.com

→ 302 → iam.ferrari.com/.../B2C_1A_SIGNUP_SIGNIN_EXT/...authorize?
    client_id=afc36caa-...
    redirect_uri=https://mystore.ferrari.com/.../authcallback/Azure_AD_B2C
    scope=profile+email+afc36caa-...
    code_challenge_method=S256

36 OAuth scopes advertised via /.well-known/openid-configuration:

full  api  lightning  visualforce  einstein_gpt_api
cdp_api  cdp_ingest_api  cdp_segment_api  cdp_profile_api
pardot_api  wave_api  chatbot_api  chatter_api  mcp_api
content  interaction_api  pwdless_login_api  forgot_password
user_registration_api  ...

Additional leaks:

  • DocuSign JWKS integration key in the OIDC JWKS endpoint
  • Auth Provider ID: 0SObG00000008FJ (leaked via error response)
  • Internal domain: ferrarispa.my.site.com
  • Dynamic Client Registration endpoint exists: /vforcesite/services/oauth2/register
  • This client also accepts Device Code Flow on the corporate tenant — the 5th vulnerable client

Finding 5 — High: Multi-Tenant Azure AD Infrastructure — 13 Client IDs, ROPC Active

Three Azure AD tenants discovered with 13 unique client IDs:

TenantTypeDomain
CorporateAzure AD (employees)51cc9718-...
B2C PRODB2C (customers)iam.ferrari.com
B2C DEVB2C (dev — public!)iam.dev.ferrari.com

High-risk grant types active on B2C PROD:

  • ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) — deprecated by RFC 6749, enables credential stuffing
  • Implicit Flow — all 8 response_types accepted (code, token, id_token, all combinations)
  • client_credentials — grant type accepted, only client_secret missing

B2C DEV tenant fully accessible: iam.dev.ferrari.com mirrors all 5 PROD policies (SIGNUP_SIGNIN_MYF, signup_signin_EXT, SIGNUP_SIGNIN, PROFILEEDIT, PASSWORDRESET) — safe environment for attack validation.

PII claim exposure via generic B2C_1A_SIGNUP_SIGNIN policy: name, family_name, extension_birthday, extension_contactMail, groups (role escalation vector).

MSAL logging enabled: logcat_enabled: true in production — tokens may appear in Android logcat output.

Finding 6 — High: Marketing Cloud Push — Hardcoded Credentials Confirmed Working

Salesforce Marketing Cloud SDK credentials hardcoded in SessionManager.smali:

ParameterValue
Application ID44f41688-72b9-4c18-bce1-101bad6b1a96
Access Token1ptqQJtwvqJPVtgNwipRr6dH
MID (Business Unit)536007106
FCM Sender ID318015891312
Server URLmcl3f8779qmp00yr5d68b63p2-s0.device.marketingcloudapis.com

Bearer token confirmed working against sync, geofence, message, and device stats APIs. With the application ID + access token, an attacker can potentially send push notifications to all MyFerrari app users, enumerate device registrations, and access geofence configurations.

Finding 7 — High: 80+ API Endpoints + 7 Hardcoded API Keys

Seven API keys extracted from the APK provide access to Ferrari's backend infrastructure:

ServiceKeyPurpose
AEM (×2)qqR9fgnFk..., szPLeLP6z...Content Management API
General (×2)NnwxtEjZ7..., JhEQJ6Ucw...MyFerrari Composition API
Thron DAMkB0xe2dot...Digital Asset Management
Google APIAIzaSyD09...Maps/Firebase
Google OAuth318015891312-...Sign-In with Google

80+ API endpoints extracted from 10 Retrofit interfaces cover connected car operations, personal documents, staff management, and internal campaigns. 12 LOVVA endpoints accept unauthenticated lookups.

CMS bypass: /cms/network/* paths bypass AWS API Gateway authentication and forward directly to the LoopBack/Node.js backend.

Infrastructure: 50+ Hostnames Mapped

LayerHostnamesStack
Identityiam.ferrari.com, iam.dev.ferrari.com, insightbot.ferrari.comAzure AD B2C + Corporate
AIapp-ib-myferrari-be-prod.azurewebsites.net (+3 instances)Python/FastAPI, Azure OpenAI
Contentaem.ferrari.com, aem.dev.ferrari.com, experience.ferrari.comAdobe Experience Manager
Commercestore.ferrari.com, mystore.ferrari.comSFCC + Salesforce Experience Cloud
Mediaferrari-view.thron.com, ferrari.scene7.comThron DAM, Adobe Scene7
Internalmodiscs.ferrari.it, hr.ferrari.com, api.ferrarinetwork.ferrari.comOracle IDCS, SAP SuccessFactors
Monitoringbf06635dnd.bf.dynatrace.comDynatrace RUM
IoTctek.public.tap-single-tenant-{1,2}.comBLE Charger (CTEK)

The full hostname inventory includes 40+ unique domains across AWS CloudFront, Azure App Services, Salesforce, Adobe, Oracle, SAP, and third-party IoT providers.

Non-Production Environments Publicly Accessible

EnvironmentURLStatus
DEV IAM (B2C)iam.dev.ferrari.com200 — Full OIDC
TEST Configuratorcarconfigurator.test.ferrari.com200 — Angular app
STAGING Scene7s7g10.scene7.com/is/image/ferraristage200 — CORS *
DEV SFCCf_ecom_bgdg_dev org ID in production JSSLAS endpoint live
DEV AEMaem.dev.ferrari.com403 (exists)

The staging redirect URI also leaks the original MVP package name: it.beatcode.FerrariMVP (developer: Beatcode S.r.l.).

Network Security Configuration

network_security_config.xml
<base-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="true">
    <trust-anchors>
        <certificates src="system"/>
    </trust-anchors>
</base-config>
<domain-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="true">
    <domain includeSubdomains="true">ferrari.com</domain>
    <trust-anchors>
        <certificates src="system"/>
        <certificates src="user"/>   <!-- USER CA TRUSTED -->
    </trust-anchors>
</domain-config>

Cleartext traffic permitted globally. User-installed CA certificates trusted for all ferrari.com subdomains — enables MitM interception of all API traffic including authentication tokens and API keys.

Combined Attack Chain

  1. Download MyFerrari APK from Google Play → extract 13 Azure AD client IDs + 7 API keys
  2. Initiate Device Code Flow with any of 5 vulnerable client IDs on the corporate tenant
  3. Social engineer one Ferrari employee to enter the code at login.microsoft.com/device
  4. Receive access_token + refresh_token with full Microsoft Graph scopes
  5. Read employee emails (Mail.Read), access OneDrive/SharePoint (Files.Read.All), enumerate directory (Directory.Read.All)
  6. Use the same token with user_impersonation scope to access InsightBot Backend
  7. Query Ferrari's internal knowledge base (RAG), download blob storage files, read all chat histories
  8. Inject poisoned answers via /store_answer with security filters toggled off
  9. Maintain persistent access via offline_access refresh token
Note: No exploitation was performed. This chain is derived entirely from static analysis of the publicly available APK on Google Play and unauthenticated probing of public endpoints.

Disclosure Timeline

Vendor Response

Ferrari S.p.A.: Dismissed all findings as "not eligible for Hall of Fame" without conducting a technical assessment. Ferrari does not operate a public bug bounty program — their security reporting page offers a Ferrari-branded hat and a factory tour as acknowledgment for vulnerability reports.

No Safe Harbor letter was offered. No technical contact was established. No remediation was performed or communicated. No NDA or coordination framework was proposed.

Zero technical engagement in 120+ days.

Affected Product

AppMyFerrari
Packageferrari.ccp.mobile (v4.4.3, vc537)
DeveloperBeatcode S.r.l. (it.beatcode.myferrari)
PlatformAndroid (Google Play, targetSdk 35)
IdentityAzure AD + B2C (3 tenants, 13 client IDs)
AI BackendInsightBot (Azure OpenAI + CosmosDB + Blob Storage)
CommerceSalesforce Experience Cloud + SFCC

Recommendations

  1. Disable Device Code Flow for all B2C/mobile client registrations on the corporate Azure AD tenant immediately
  2. Restrict Swagger UI on InsightBot production backend behind authentication or remove it entirely
  3. Restrict Salesforce GraphQL API — 706 types should not be queryable without authentication
  4. Rotate Marketing Cloud push credentials (Application ID + Access Token confirmed working)
  5. Disable ROPC and implicit flow on B2C PROD policies — use authorization code + PKCE only
  6. Remove PII claims (birthday, groups, contactMail) from the generic SIGNUP_SIGNIN policy
  7. Restrict DEV environments (iam.dev.ferrari.com, carconfigurator.test.ferrari.com) behind VPN
  8. Remove user CA trust from network_security_config.xml and enable certificate pinning
  9. Rotate all 7 API keys and move to server-side configuration
  10. Implement a security vulnerability disclosure program with professional coordination processes

Credits

Discovered and reported by Burak Yilmaz, BuriLabs Security Research.
Reference: BuriLabs-FERRARI-001