13 Azure AD client IDs. 3 tenants. 5 clients accept Device Code Flow with full Microsoft Graph scopes — Mail.Read, Files.Read.All, Directory.Read.All. The InsightBot AI production backend ships an open Swagger UI. Salesforce GraphQL returns 706 types, 53 profiles, and 24 approval workflows — no authentication required. Ferrari dismissed these findings as "not eligible for Hall of Fame."
Remediation after 120+ days: Zero confirmed fixes. All Device Code Flow endpoints remain active. InsightBot Swagger UI still accessible. Marketing Cloud push credentials confirmed working. Vendor dismissed findings without technical review.
Five Azure AD client IDs extracted from the publicly available APK and HTTP response headers can initiate Device Code Flow on Ferrari's corporate Azure AD tenant (51cc9718-...), requesting unrestricted Microsoft Graph API scopes:
| Client ID | Source | Corporate DC | Graph Scope |
|---|---|---|---|
607073c1-... | APK MSAL PROD | YES | YES |
aeabe035-... | APK MSAL STAGING | YES | YES |
0ca73ac6-... | App Proxy HTTP headers | YES | YES |
afc36caa-... | Salesforce SSO redirect | YES | YES |
ac653b01-... | EasyAuth redirect | YES | YES |
All dangerous Graph scopes accepted:
Mail.Read — Read all employee emails
Mail.ReadWrite — Read AND send emails as employee
Files.Read.All — OneDrive + SharePoint files
User.Read.All — Enumerate entire corporate directory
Directory.Read.All — Full directory structure
Sites.Read.All — All SharePoint sites
Team.ReadBasic.All — All Microsoft Teams
Calendars.Read — Employee calendar events
offline_access — Persistent refresh token
POST /51cc9718-.../oauth2/v2.0/devicecode
Host: login.microsoftonline.com
client_id=0ca73ac6-...&scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default
→ 200 OK
{
"user_code": "D3E4DXBLH",
"verification_uri": "https://login.microsoft.com/device",
"expires_in": 900,
"message": "To sign in, use a web browser to open the page
https://login.microsoft.com/device and enter
the code D3E4DXBLH to authenticate."
}
The attack uses Microsoft's own legitimate login page — no phishing domain, no spoofed page. An employee entering the device code at login.microsoft.com/device grants the attacker full Graph API access with persistent refresh tokens.
Ferrari's internal AI assistant InsightBot — powered by Azure OpenAI + Azure AI Search (RAG) — has its production backend exposed with full Swagger UI:
| Component | Hostname | Status |
|---|---|---|
| PROD Backend | app-ib-myferrari-be-prod.azurewebsites.net | 200 — Swagger UI + OpenAPI open |
| PROD Frontend | app-ib-myferrari-fe-prod.azurewebsites.net | 403 — Disabled |
| Custom Domain | insightbot.ferrari.com | 401 — Corp Azure AD |
8 API endpoints exposed via OpenAPI 3.1.0 spec:
| Endpoint | Method | Function |
|---|---|---|
/chat | POST | Query internal knowledge base (Azure OpenAI RAG) |
/chat/stream | POST | Streaming chat with SSE |
/getChatHistory | GET | Retrieve chat histories (IDOR via conversation_id) |
/content/{path} | GET | Download files from Azure Blob Storage |
/store_answer | POST | Inject/modify answers in knowledge base |
/deleteChatHistory | POST | Delete conversation histories |
/sendFeedback | POST | Submit feedback on responses |
/realtime | WebSocket | Real-time voice chat (GPT-4o) |
Security filter bypass: The chat API accepts client-controlled parameters use_groups_security_filter and use_oid_security_filter — toggling them to false bypasses all access controls on the RAG knowledge base.
CORS misconfiguration: access-control-allow-origin: * — any website can make cross-origin requests to the InsightBot API.
Combined with Device Code Flow (Finding 1): 5 public client IDs accept user_impersonation scope on the InsightBot Backend API (api://3844adce-...). A single social engineering step gives an attacker full access to Ferrari's internal AI, knowledge base, chat histories, and blob storage.
The Ferrari MyStore at mystore.ferrari.com (Salesforce Experience Cloud) exposes its full GraphQL API without authentication:
| Metric | Count |
|---|---|
| GraphQL Types | 706 |
| Internal Profiles | 53 (Ferrari Dealer, Hostess, Executive Sponsor, Concierge, Einstein Agent, SCIM Admin...) |
| Approval Workflows | 24 (Atelier, Tailor Made, Factory Tours, Corse Clienti, WEC Sponsor...) |
| Static Resources | 375 (103.8 MB) |
| Entity Definitions | 178 |
| User Type Fields | 225 |
| Queryable sObjects | 32+ |
Internal profiles exposed reveal Ferrari's complete organizational hierarchy: dealer networks, event staff (Hostess, Executive Sponsor), racing programs (Corse Clienti, WEC), AI agents (Einstein Agent), and administrative roles (SCIM Admin, Platform Integration User).
Approval workflows expose Ferrari's internal business processes: Atelier customization, Tailor Made program, Factory Tours authorization, racing sponsorship approval — revealing operational details and customer management structure.
The Salesforce SSO authentication flow from mystore.ferrari.com reveals a complete authentication chain exposing the 12th Azure AD client ID and 36 OAuth scopes:
GET /services/auth/sso/Azure_AD_B2C
Host: mystore.ferrari.com
→ 302 → iam.ferrari.com/.../B2C_1A_SIGNUP_SIGNIN_EXT/...authorize?
client_id=afc36caa-...
redirect_uri=https://mystore.ferrari.com/.../authcallback/Azure_AD_B2C
scope=profile+email+afc36caa-...
code_challenge_method=S256
36 OAuth scopes advertised via /.well-known/openid-configuration:
full api lightning visualforce einstein_gpt_api
cdp_api cdp_ingest_api cdp_segment_api cdp_profile_api
pardot_api wave_api chatbot_api chatter_api mcp_api
content interaction_api pwdless_login_api forgot_password
user_registration_api ...
Additional leaks:
0SObG00000008FJ (leaked via error response)ferrarispa.my.site.com/vforcesite/services/oauth2/registerThree Azure AD tenants discovered with 13 unique client IDs:
| Tenant | Type | Domain |
|---|---|---|
| Corporate | Azure AD (employees) | 51cc9718-... |
| B2C PROD | B2C (customers) | iam.ferrari.com |
| B2C DEV | B2C (dev — public!) | iam.dev.ferrari.com |
High-risk grant types active on B2C PROD:
B2C DEV tenant fully accessible: iam.dev.ferrari.com mirrors all 5 PROD policies (SIGNUP_SIGNIN_MYF, signup_signin_EXT, SIGNUP_SIGNIN, PROFILEEDIT, PASSWORDRESET) — safe environment for attack validation.
PII claim exposure via generic B2C_1A_SIGNUP_SIGNIN policy: name, family_name, extension_birthday, extension_contactMail, groups (role escalation vector).
MSAL logging enabled: logcat_enabled: true in production — tokens may appear in Android logcat output.
Salesforce Marketing Cloud SDK credentials hardcoded in SessionManager.smali:
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Application ID | 44f41688-72b9-4c18-bce1-101bad6b1a96 |
| Access Token | 1ptqQJtwvqJPVtgNwipRr6dH |
| MID (Business Unit) | 536007106 |
| FCM Sender ID | 318015891312 |
| Server URL | mcl3f8779qmp00yr5d68b63p2-s0.device.marketingcloudapis.com |
Bearer token confirmed working against sync, geofence, message, and device stats APIs. With the application ID + access token, an attacker can potentially send push notifications to all MyFerrari app users, enumerate device registrations, and access geofence configurations.
Seven API keys extracted from the APK provide access to Ferrari's backend infrastructure:
| Service | Key | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| AEM (×2) | qqR9fgnFk..., szPLeLP6z... | Content Management API |
| General (×2) | NnwxtEjZ7..., JhEQJ6Ucw... | MyFerrari Composition API |
| Thron DAM | kB0xe2dot... | Digital Asset Management |
| Google API | AIzaSyD09... | Maps/Firebase |
| Google OAuth | 318015891312-... | Sign-In with Google |
80+ API endpoints extracted from 10 Retrofit interfaces cover connected car operations, personal documents, staff management, and internal campaigns. 12 LOVVA endpoints accept unauthenticated lookups.
CMS bypass: /cms/network/* paths bypass AWS API Gateway authentication and forward directly to the LoopBack/Node.js backend.
| Layer | Hostnames | Stack |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | iam.ferrari.com, iam.dev.ferrari.com, insightbot.ferrari.com | Azure AD B2C + Corporate |
| AI | app-ib-myferrari-be-prod.azurewebsites.net (+3 instances) | Python/FastAPI, Azure OpenAI |
| Content | aem.ferrari.com, aem.dev.ferrari.com, experience.ferrari.com | Adobe Experience Manager |
| Commerce | store.ferrari.com, mystore.ferrari.com | SFCC + Salesforce Experience Cloud |
| Media | ferrari-view.thron.com, ferrari.scene7.com | Thron DAM, Adobe Scene7 |
| Internal | modiscs.ferrari.it, hr.ferrari.com, api.ferrarinetwork.ferrari.com | Oracle IDCS, SAP SuccessFactors |
| Monitoring | bf06635dnd.bf.dynatrace.com | Dynatrace RUM |
| IoT | ctek.public.tap-single-tenant-{1,2}.com | BLE Charger (CTEK) |
The full hostname inventory includes 40+ unique domains across AWS CloudFront, Azure App Services, Salesforce, Adobe, Oracle, SAP, and third-party IoT providers.
| Environment | URL | Status |
|---|---|---|
| DEV IAM (B2C) | iam.dev.ferrari.com | 200 — Full OIDC |
| TEST Configurator | carconfigurator.test.ferrari.com | 200 — Angular app |
| STAGING Scene7 | s7g10.scene7.com/is/image/ferraristage | 200 — CORS * |
| DEV SFCC | f_ecom_bgdg_dev org ID in production JS | SLAS endpoint live |
| DEV AEM | aem.dev.ferrari.com | 403 (exists) |
The staging redirect URI also leaks the original MVP package name: it.beatcode.FerrariMVP (developer: Beatcode S.r.l.).
<base-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="true">
<trust-anchors>
<certificates src="system"/>
</trust-anchors>
</base-config>
<domain-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="true">
<domain includeSubdomains="true">ferrari.com</domain>
<trust-anchors>
<certificates src="system"/>
<certificates src="user"/> <!-- USER CA TRUSTED -->
</trust-anchors>
</domain-config>
Cleartext traffic permitted globally. User-installed CA certificates trusted for all ferrari.com subdomains — enables MitM interception of all API traffic including authentication tokens and API keys.
login.microsoft.com/deviceuser_impersonation scope to access InsightBot Backend/store_answer with security filters toggled offoffline_access refresh tokenFerrari S.p.A.: Dismissed all findings as "not eligible for Hall of Fame" without conducting a technical assessment. Ferrari does not operate a public bug bounty program — their security reporting page offers a Ferrari-branded hat and a factory tour as acknowledgment for vulnerability reports.
No Safe Harbor letter was offered. No technical contact was established. No remediation was performed or communicated. No NDA or coordination framework was proposed.
Zero technical engagement in 120+ days.
| App | MyFerrari |
|---|---|
| Package | ferrari.ccp.mobile (v4.4.3, vc537) |
| Developer | Beatcode S.r.l. (it.beatcode.myferrari) |
| Platform | Android (Google Play, targetSdk 35) |
| Identity | Azure AD + B2C (3 tenants, 13 client IDs) |
| AI Backend | InsightBot (Azure OpenAI + CosmosDB + Blob Storage) |
| Commerce | Salesforce Experience Cloud + SFCC |
Discovered and reported by Burak Yilmaz, BuriLabs Security Research.
Reference: BuriLabs-FERRARI-001